The Utility of Hypno-Induced Statements in the Trial Process: Reflections on \u3ci\u3ePeople v. Smrekar\u3c/i\u3e by Spector, Robert G. & Foster, Teree E.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 10
Issue 4 Summer 1979 Article 4
1979
The Utility of Hypno-Induced Statements in the
Trial Process: Reflections on People v. Smrekar
Robert G. Spector
Prof. of Law, Loyola Univ. of Chicago
Teree E. Foster
Assist. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Oklahoma Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert G. Spector, & Teree E. Foster, The Utility of Hypno-Induced Statements in the Trial Process: Reflections on People v. Smrekar, 10
Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 691 (1979).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol10/iss4/4
The Utility of Hypno-Induced Statements in the
Trial Process: Reflections on People v. Smrekar
ROBERT G. SPECTOR*
TEREE E. FOSTER**
INTRODUCTION
The recent proliferation of cases' and literature2 discussing hyp-
nosis3 emphasizes the impact of this phenomenon upon investiga-
* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Ford Motor
Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.
1974); Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); People v.
Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963); People v. Busch, 56 Cal.2d
868, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961); People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App. 2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr.
906 (1968); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Harding v. State, 5
Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978);
State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1951); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1975); State v. Harris, 241 Or. 500, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App.
1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
2. See references collected in Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is
the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Spector
& Foster]; see also Hypnotized Witnesses May Remember Too Much, 64 A.B.A.J. 187 (1978);
Time, Sept. 13, 1976, at 56; Breo, Trouble With Hypnosis? Its Name, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov.
24, 1978, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Breo]; Monroe, Justice With Glazed Eyes, JURIs DOCTOR
54 (Oct./Nov. 1978).
3. The phenomenon of hypnosis, although incapable of precise definition, may be de-
scribed as a process wherein the subject experiences an alteration in consciousness and con-
centration, and manifests a heightened degree of suggestibility, while awareness is main-
tained. Suggestibility, the primary component of the hypnotic state, may be characterized
by the manner in which a subject responds to suggestion. Heuristically, hypnosis is that state
or condition in which suggestions or cues from the hypnotist will elicit responses.
Hypnotic phenomena can operationally be distinguished from nonhypnotic respon-
ses only when suggestions are given that require the [subject] to distort his percep-
tion or memory. Accordingly, the hypnotized individual can be identified only by
his ability to respond to suitable suggestions by appropriately altering any or all
modalities of perception and memory.
Orne, On the Simulating Subject as a Quasi-control Group in Hypnosis Research: What, Why
& How, in HYPNOSIS: RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS & PERSPECTIVES 400 (E. Fromm & R. Shor eds.
1972) [hereinafter cited as Fromm & Shor]. See also D. CHEEK & L. LECRoN, CLINICAL
HYPNOTHERAPY 13 (1968); Fromm & Shor, Underlying Theoretical Issues: An Introduction, in
Fromm & Shor, supra, at 3-4; Sheehan, Hypnosis and the Manipulation of "'Imagination",
in Fromm & Shor, supra, at 297; Ulett & Peterson, Applied Hypnosis and Positive Suggestion,
in MEDICINE, DENTISTRY AND PATIENT CARE 13 (1965).
Scientific explanation of the hypnotic process, of characteristics of varying depths, or
levels, of trance, and of hypnotic susceptibility, as well as depiction of medical and scientific
use of hypnosis, is set forth in Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 569-79.
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tory' and trial" phases of the legal process. Such discussion also
indicates recognition by the legal system that hypnosis, when pro-
perly employed, is a useful device for retrieval of otherwise inacces-
sible material. Questions concerning the relationship between hyp-
nosis and the evidentiary process have emerged concomitant with
this recognition. Courts have begun, and must continue, to define
this relationship. Hypnosis remains, however, a complex phenome-
non,6 requiring considerable and close analysis before judgments are
made concerning admissibility of hypnotic material.
People v. Smrekar' is the first case in which the issue of admissi-
bility of hypno-induced statements and thus, the status of hypnosis
as an appurtenance to the evidentiary process, was squarely pre-
sented to an Illinois Appellate Court." The function of this article is
to analyze the rationale for the opinion and to offer recommenda-
tions regarding the admissibility and utility of evidence gleaned
through hypnotic processes.
People v. Smrekar
In People v. Smrekar,9 defendant was convicted of the shotgun
murders of a potential prosecution witness against defendant in a
misdemeanor theft case, and his wife.'0 Defendant raised an alibi
4. Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 579-80; Breo, Am. Med. News, Nov. 24, 1978, at 12.
5. Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 582-613.
6. Scientists agree that the study of hypnosis as a scientific phenomenon, despite its
widespread use and impact as a clinical and diagnostic tool, has not yet attained an advanced
state of scientific development. Much is known regarding the occurrence of hypnosis in terms
of clinical skill and practical application, but the art of its application still far outstrips its
scientific elucidation. See Fromm & Shor, Underlying Theoretical Issues: An Introduction,
in Fromm & Shor, supra note 3, at 3-4.
7. 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal. 12 Official Reports xxvi (June 13, 1979).
8. In People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App. 2d 204, 250 N.E.2d 5 (1969), a rape victim suffering
hysterical amnesia voluntarily submitted herself to a psychiatric examination in an attempt
to recall the identity of her assailant. Both sodium amobarbital (a truth serum) and hypnosis
were used during the course of the examination although hypnosis proved unproductive in
retrieving any information. The trial court's order excluding evidence of "any facts or su'p-
posed facts," 111 Ill. App. 2d at 206, 250 N.E.2d at 5, acquired wholly through the use of either
scientific technique was affirmed. Although the opinion addressed only the lack of reliability
inherent in narcoanalysis as a truth-determinant, the court noted concerning the use of
hypnosis:
We see no reason to equate examination under hypnosis and examination while
under the influence of a drug having the effect of a so-called "truth serum" except
to note that the scientific reliability of neither is sufficient to justify the use of test
results of either in the serious business of criminal prosecution.
111 Ill. App. 2d 204, 209, 250 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1969).
9. 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979).
10. Another prosecution witness in the misdemeanor case disappeared some months prior
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defense, supported by testimony of his mother, father, cousin, and
girlfriend. A sister of the slain witness who lived next door to him
testified that on the night of the homicides, upon hearing a "roaring
noise" from the direction of her brother's house, she peered out the
window and observed, for a 30-40 second interval, a man lingering
in her brother's yard. After attempts to contact her brother by tele-
phone proved futile, the witness and her husband entered the
brother's residence and discovered the bodies. This witness identi-
fied defendant as the person she had observed loitering outside her
brother's residence shortly before the slayings.
On the day after the killings, the witness had selected two photo-
graphs from a police display as resembling the man she had ob-
served. One of the photographs was of the defendant. During the
next several days, the witness, concerned about the quality of her
memory of the occurrence, consulted a physician on three occasions.
During her visits to the physician, she twice underwent examination
through the use of hypnosis. The physician, a general practioner
who was not certified as a specialist in hypnotic processes but had
utilized hypnosis regularly in his practice for 10 to 15 years, testified
that he had maintained no permanent record of the conversations
between himself and the witness during the hypnotic induction ses-
sions. He further stated that his procedure involved directing the
witness "to form a picture in her mind of the scene she saw . . .
when she looked out and noticed a man"" in her brother's yard.
Nine days after the slayings, the witness fortuitously encountered
the defendant at the county courthouse, and immediately singled
him out to the officers accompanying her as the person she had seen
near her brother's residence.
Although no objection was lodged at trial, defendant urged on
appeal that the witness' in-court identification of defendant, as a
product of the courthouse encounter, which defendant contended
was influenced by the hypnotic experiences of the witness, was im-
permissibly tainted. In affirming the conviction, the court noted
that the propriety of utilizing extrinsic aids in an attempt to stimu-
late a witness' recollection is ordinarily unquestioned, and bears
only on the witness' credibility. 2 After reviewing recent judicial
to these killings; although her bloodstained automobile was later discovered, her whereabouts
remained unknown. Id.
11. 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 387, 385 N.E.2d 848, 854 (1979).
12. As the court noted, the issue is drawn somewhat differently in a criminal case, where
a question regarding the validity of an in-court identification is raised. The trial identification
is impermissible where defendant demonstrates that it has been sullied by "a prior unduly
suggestive procedure and has no independent origin." Id. at 386, 385 N.E.2d at 853. The
19791
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authority approving the use of trial testimony of persons whose
faltering memories had been restored through hypnotic induction,
the court ruled that the hypnotic techniques experiencd by the wit-
ness, at the hands of an operator deemed competent, were not
tainted by undue suggestiveness. When she testified on the basis of
her restored recollection, the witness was subject to cross-
examination. Therefore defendant was deprived of no trial safe-
guards. "While the hypnosis could affect the mind of the witness in
such a subconscious way that the cross-examination could not
reach, all witnesses are, to some extent, subject to subconscious
stimuli similarly obscure."' 3
In dissent, Justice Craven articulated a dual concern regarding
the admissibility of testimony from a witness whose recall of the
incident in question has been refreshed after hypnotic treatment.
Analogizing the properties of hypnosis as a truth-determinant to
similar capabilities allegedly possessed by scientific processes such
as narcoanalysis, polygraphy, and spectrography, Justice Craven
denounced what he perceived to be the consequence of the majority
determination of admissibility of this hypno-retrieved testimony:
that "any other real or imagined way of judging truth would be
rendered admissible with only the weight to be given to such testi-
mony left for resolution by the trier of fact."' 4 Moreover, his inspec-
tion of the record revealed a dearth of foundation evidence concern-
ing the validity and effectiveness of hypnosis as a retrieval device
generally as well as the nature and propriety of procedures adopted
by the operator in this case. 5 Thus, Justice Craven concluded:
While I am not persuaded that the truth-seeking process is neces-
sarily helped by the use of hypnosis, I certainly am persuaded that
it is incumbent upon one who tenders testimony retrieved, en-
hanced, or obtained by hypnosis to establish what the procedure
is, what its limitations are, and what such tinkering amounts to.
Absent such foundation, the evidence is inadmissible.
witness' spontaneous identification of defendant at the county courthouse was found amply
corroborated by independent evidence, of which the witness was unaware at that time. Her
observation of the person on the night of the murders, which she recalled after hypnotic
treatment, provided the requisite independent origin for the identification. Id. at 388, 385
N.E.2d at 855.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 395, 385 N.E.2d at 860.
15. "There is no foundation in the record, there is no showing as to the scientific basis
for hypnosis, there is no recording of the hypnosis sessions, there is nothing to establish that
the testimony thus retrieved is substantially probative and an aid in the truth-seeking pro-
cess." Id. at 394, 385 N.E.2d at 859.
16. Id. at 395, 385 N.E.2d at 859-60.
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VALIDITY OF HYPNOSIS AS A RECOLLECTION RETRIEVAL DEVICE
Justice Craven's identification of hypnosis as a device which pur-
ports to separate fact from fantasy and impel a subject to utter only
truth expresses a fundamental, yet common, misperception among
courts 7 and commentators"5 regarding the nature of this scientific
phenomenon. Emphatically, hypnosis does not purport to function
as a litmus test for truthfulness. It must be divorced from processes,
such as narcoanalysis and polygraphy, which allegedly serve as
techniques for mechanically determining the genuineness of the wit-
ness' testimony. Rather, the utility of hypnosis is due to its scientifi-
cally established significance as a tool for attaining or retrieving
suppressed or unrecollected material, notwithstanding the truth or
falsity of that information. 0
Requiring hypnosis to perform a truth-determinant function as a
precondition to admissibility of evidence obtained by its use trans-
mogrifies this scientific process and aborts its potential benefit to
17. See, e.g., People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App. 2d 204, 250 N.E.2d 5 (1969); Greenfield v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1 (1964); Note, Hypnosis, Truth Drugs, and the Polygraph: An Analysis of Their Use
and Acceptance by the Courts, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 541 (1969).
19. Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 569-79, and authorities cited therein.
20. The opposite of this position is that of some scientists who actively oppose introducing
hypno-induced material in the trial process. See references cited at note 2, supra. Their basis
is that hypnosis cannot guarantee veracity of information obtained thereby either objectively
or subjectively, rendering its courtroom use dangerous and unwarranted. It is submitted that
this position, although accurate in its assessment of hypnosis' capabilities misapprehends the
dictates of the evidentiary process. Accuracy and truthfulness of proposed testimony are not
inflexible prerequisites for admissibility; evidence which may be inaccurate or which tends
to deceive is not automatically excluded. Perceptual psychologists, for example, agree that
eyewitness testimony is often factually inaccurate and unreliable, characteristically riddled
with fantasy, prejudice, misperception and bias. See, e.g., Buckout, Psychology and Eyewit-
ness Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCH. REv. 75 (1976); Buckout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15
JutUMETRiCS J. 171 (1975); Fishman & Loftus, Expert Psychological Testimony in Eyewitness
Identification, 4 LAW & PSYCH. REv. 87 (1979); Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis
and a Proposal, 10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 299 (1979); Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible
Eyewitness, 15 JuIMETrmcs J. 188 (1975); Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A
Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1.
Yet such testimony is routinely admitted for scrutiny by the finder of fact because it is
insulated, to some degree, from risks of flawed perception, erroneous recall, imprecision of
language and insincerity by the enforcement of procedural safeguards, such as opportunity
for cross-examination. The acuity, sincerity and credibility of the witness are subject to
probing through the panoply of testimonial protections inherent in the trial process, so that
risks of error are minimized to the extent possible in our adversary system.
The issue raised by the introduction of hypno-induced evidence is whether the process, as
a scientific phenomenon, accomplishes what it purports to accomplish, attaining or retrieving
otherwise inaccessible information. This issue is, as Justice Craven perceived, a matter of
adducing a proper foundation, a question discussed at text accompanying notes 35 through
38, infra.
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litigation. Recognition of hypnosis as merely a means by which tes-
timony otherwise unattainable might be aquired, but which offers
no warranties concerning its verisimilitude, allows development of
concomitant procedural safeguards. Thus, the admissibility of evi-
dence bearing some probity is assured, while the integrity of the
judicial and evidentiary processes remains intact. The cogent in-
quiry confronting courts is not simply whether hypno-induced testi-
mony should be admitted at all, but whether incorporation of this
evidence in the trial process accords with recognized capabilities of
the phenomenon as well as with established evidentiary principles.
Thus stated, the issue must be resolved affirmatively, since valid
uses for hypno-induced statements are demonstrable.
UTILITY OF HYPNO-INDUCED STATEMENTS
a) Stimulating the Recall of Witnesses
Given the effectiveness of hypnosis as a recollection retrieval de-
vice, its primary significance in litigation lies in its restorative po-
tential in the treatment of amnesiac witnesses. In accordance with
the Smrekar majority, courts which have considered the question
have proven receptive to permitting testimony of a witness whose
amnesia concerning the litigated event has been treated and dis-
pelled through pretrial application of hypnotic processes,2 as the
phenomenon of recall has been accorded general recognition. 2  Intro-
duction of testimony of a witness whose recall has been enhanced
through pretrial hypnosis must be tempered by imposition of ade-
quate safeguards. Where this is accomplished, it must be recog-
nized that a memory revived through the device of hypnosis is as
valid as, and therefore, in terms of legal effect, indistinguishable
21. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., Inc.,
523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974);
Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968); State v. McQueen,
295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434 (1972); State
v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971). Contra, Austin v. Barker, 110 App. Div. 510,
96 N.Y.S. 814 (1906).
22. United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Riccardi,
174 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949); Fanelli v. United States Gypsum
Co., 141 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1944); Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1926). See
also Maguire and Quick, Testimony: Memory and Memoranda, 3 How. L.J. 1 (1957); Hutch-
ins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Memory, 41 HARV. L. REv.
860 (1928).
Procedures governing the refreshment process are codified in the federal system at Rule 612
FED. R. EviD.
23. See text accompanying notes 35 through 38 infra for a proposal concerning foundation
evidence which must be adduced as a prelude to admissibility.
[Vol. 10
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from, a memory restored through application of any approved tech-
nique, such as requesting the witness to peruse a document while
on the witness stand, or employing leading questions.'4
Concededly, employment of hypnotic processes as a recall stimu-
lation device fosters additional concerns which must be addressed
in order to assure the reliability of the forthcoming testimony. Pecu-
liar to espousal of hypnosis as a memory restorative are two prob-
lems: the prospect that the aura of augmented suggestibility in
which the hypnotized subject is suspended will engender distortion;
and the possibility that the jury will give undue significance to
hypno-induced testimony.2 Conditioning admissibility of this testi-
mony upon fulfillment of procedural safeguards alleviates both con-
cerns.
Distortion of the hypnotically-revived witness' testimony may
arise in two ways: the hypnotized witness may, during the process
of recall, commingle fantasy with fact, yet remain steadfast after-
24.. Adducing proper foundation evidence for the hypno-restored testimony, which is sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny and cross-examination, is similar to procedures followed generally
when a memorandum or other aid is used to stimulate a witness' failing recollection. The
court retains authority to exclude restorative material where its worth as a refresher is out-
weighed by the danger of undue suggestion. Moreover, the adversary is entitled to inspect
any aid, and to use it as the basis for cross-examination of the revived witness. FED. R. Evi).
612.
25. A frequently expressed fear concerning use of hypno-induced testimony is that the
hypnotized subject retains whatever faculty he has for lying. At least two variables are
pertinent. The subject may feign induction into the hypnotic state; or the truly hypnotized
subject may deliberately dissemble where it is to his benefit. Procedures exist to assure that
the subject remains entranced and relates "fact" as he has perceived it. For example, analge-
sia is experienced by the hypnotized subject only after a medium trance level has been
achieved. A subject who exhibits a reflex response to a pin prick, yet feigns a medium or deep
trance, is clearly simulating. Or, the operator may implant a suggestion that a physical
reaction, such as a thumb-flick or a knee-jerk, will accompany a lie and that the presence of
this reaction will persist into the waking state. However, the consensus of informed opinion
is that a hypnotized subject is capable of deception if so motivated. The degree of reliability
attributable to the behavior of the cooperative, truly hypnotized individual is difficult for
even the skilled operator to ascertain. See generally, H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 138-41 (1967); W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 246 (1962); H.
CRASILNECK & J. HALL, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 29 (1975); Brum,
Retrograde Amnesia in a Murder Suspect, 10 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 209 (1968); Levitt &
Chapman, Hypnosis as a Research Method, in Fromm & Shor, supra note 3, at 109.
This concern for the possibility of deception on the part of the subject, either during the
process of induction or afterwards, is not peculiar to the use of hypnosis. Statements made
by the witness under hypnosis are not admissible as accreditation of his trial testimony. Jones
v. State, 542 P.2d 1319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). Any self-interest or bias on the part of the
hypnotized subject provides the same basis for shading or distortion of the recounting of an
event as exists in witnesses generally. Fear of a perjury prosecution, cross-examination and
aspects of the trial process, such as the solemnity of the proceedings and the administration
of an oath, remain effective implements for detecting and deterring falsehood in either con-
text.
Loyola University Law Journal
wards in proclaiming the accuracy of his statements; or, the subject,
due to heightened suggestibility, may seek to conform the material
he communicates to what he perceives to be the expectations of the
operator.
Distortion attributable to the witness' mixture of reality and im-
agination during the hypnotic recollection process does not differ
from perceptual and memory flaws which plague witness' testimony
generally. The vagaries of any witness' ability to perceive, recall and
articulate is well-documented in both legal and scientific litera-
ture. 2 That the testimony of a witness who undergoes hypnosis is
not conducive to warranting the objective accuracy of all facts en-
compassed therein simply fails to state a ground for exclusion, given
the overall lack of reliability in the functioning of errant human
faculties generally. Thus, the testimony of the witness whose recol-
lection has been hypnotically restored poses no more potential for
inaccuracy due to disabilities associated with perception, memory,
and articulation than the testimony of any other witness.
Concern regarding the validity of the hypnotically-restored mem-
ory of the witness is warranted," for it is heightened susceptibility
to suggestion which defines and characterizes the hypnotic state.2"
However, two points should be stated. First, in any interrogation
situation, there is the risk that the person subject to inquiry will
attempt to mold his information to assuage the interrogator. During
hypnotic induction, as in other interrogation situations, the signifi-
cance of this risk is dependent upon the balance of numerous fac-
tors, such as pliability and desire to conform on the part of the
subject, and the degree of authority exerted by the interrogator .3
The influence of these factors during hypnotic induction can be
26. The functioning of perceptual processes is highly influenced by the subjective biases,
prior conditioning, and preconceptions of the observer. Likewise, memory, as a cognitive,
reconstructive process, is susceptible to subjective components. Imprecision in verbalization
is a common difficulty. See Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 587-91, and authorities cited
therein.
27. In fact, since a hypnotized subject may be "age regressed," or transported backward
in time, so that he actually re-experiences the incident in question, distortions that typically
occur through the exercise of cognitive memory processes are precluded. R. REIFF & M.
SCHEERER, MEMORY AND HYPNOTIC AGE REGRESSION 52-53 (1959). For an explanation of the
hypnotic processes of age regression, hypermnesia and posthypnotic suggestion, see Spector
& Foster, supra note 2, at 573-74, and authorities cited therein.
28. "The nature of hypnosis is such that you respond to suggestion . The same way I
can help you refresh your memory, I also can help you construct memory where there isn't
any." Wall Street Journal, June 27, 1978, quoted in People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379,
394, 385 N.E.2d 848, 859 (1979)(Craven, J., dissenting).
29. See note 3, supra, and authorities cited therein.
30. A. TRANKELL, RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE 25-27 (1972); Marshall, Evidence, Psychology,
and the Trial: Some Challenges to the Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 197, 213-14 (1963).
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circumscribed to some extent by imposition of procedural safe-
guards; to the extent these factors remain uncontrolled, they bear
upon the credibility of the testimony so adduced. Second, in ordi-
nary encounters which occur during the trial and related processes
between witnesses and questioners, such as attorneys, police, or
insurance adjusters, the nature and form of the inquiry posed often
unwittingly modify the original memory of the witness. In the com-
monplace trial procedure of refreshing the recollection of a witness
through the use of leading questions, for example, deliberate alter-
ing of a single word might dramatically alter the witness' account
of the occurrence. 3' Thus, the influence wielded by suggestiveness
over witness' testimony, although somewhat weakened by cross-
examination, remains a force even in the absence of hypnosis.32
The unique hazard of suggestiveness posed by hypnosis is the risk
that the restored memory forming the basis for the witness' testi-
mony has been the object of tampering during the induction pro-
cess, that the suggestibility engendered in the hypnotic subject has
resulted in a reconstructed, rather than a revived, memory.3 3 This
danger is mitigated, however, as Justice Craven suggests, 34 by for-
mulation of stringently adhered to foundation requirements as a
pre-condition to admissibility of testimony of any hypnotically-
revived witness.
Indeed the prime difficulty with the Smrekar case is the diver-
gence in viewpoint between the majority and the dissent concerning
the adequacy of the foundation evidence adduced. The operator
testified to his regular use of hypnosis as a treatment device in his
general practice of medicine, summarized the technique utilized in
this particular case, and stated that he suggested no specific images
to the witness during induction. Although minimal at best, the ma-
31. See Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15 JURIMETRICS J.
188, 190-92 (1975), wherein the author demonstrates varying responses elicited when several
questions concerning whether observers had seen "a broken headlight" were changed to "the
broken headlight." The latter form of the questions, imparting an implicit belief on the part
of the examiner, elicited many more affirmative responses. Similar variations in response
occurred when subjects were asked to estimate the speed of vehicles involved in a collision
when the cars "hit," as opposed to using the more descriptive terms, "smashed" or
"collided."
32. Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Effects of Kind of Questions and Atmosphere of Inter-
rogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1620 (1971); Stern,
The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PsYcH. 3, 8 (1939). The Smrekar
majority was cognizant of this potential risk.
33. It is this aspect of the suggestibility associated with hypnosis which seems to be one
of the significant bases for his concern. People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 394, 385 N.E.2d
848, 859 (1979).
34. Id. at 394, 385 N.E.2d at 859-60.
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jority determined this evidence sufficient to establish the compe-
tence of the operator and lack of undue suggestiveness in the induc-
tion procedures utilized.
In order to prevent the possibility of improper suggestion during
the induction process and to assure sufficient explanation of the role
of hypnosis in the retrieval of faltering recollection for the trier of
fact, it is submitted that, at a minimum, the foundation must en-
compass the following information.
The operator who induced the trance should, after detailing his
qualifications and experience, 35 explain the function performed by
hypnosis in the treatment of amnesia and retrieval of previously
unremembered information generally, and state his opinion con-
cerning the dependability of hypnosis as a retrieval device. He
should identify and explain the etiology of the amnesia or psyco-
logical disturbance which afflicted the subject, and specify the pro-
cedures employed to induce trance and to ascertain duration of the
desired hypnotic trance depth.31 Although it might not prove feasi-
ble to mandate that the proponent of the hypno-induced testimony
supplement the operator's description of the hypnotic technique
used by producing a transcript or film of the session, availability of
such material would prove helpful to the finder of fact. It also would
enhance the believability of the operator's testimony that no undue
suggestion tainted the induction process.37 Finally, the operator
35. Standards for determining competency of the hypnotist are discussed at text accom-
panying notes 40 through 43 infra.
36. See discussion and authorities cited at note 25 supra.
37. See People v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 n.12 (9th Cir. 1978):
We think that, at a minimum, complete stenographic records of interviews of
hypnotized persons who later testify should be maintained. Only if the judge, jury,
and the opponent know who was present, questions that were asked, and the wit-
ness's responses can the matter be dealt with effectively. An audio or video record-
ing of the interview would be helpful.
Although the existence of a preserved record is desirable, some practical considerations
should be noted. Some hypnotists may not be equipped to record an entire induction session,
either mechanically or through stenographic resources, particularly where it is a long session.
The presence of a stenographer or a recording device might disrupt the concentration of the
subject, and therefore the effectiveness of the session. It might prove unfeasible and counter-
productive to read into evidence a question-and-answer transcript of a long session. The sheer
drama conveyed by an audio or visual recording may mesmerize the jurors and render cau-
tionary instructions ineffectual, see note 52 infra, although this contention may accord too
little sophistication to modern juries. In a murder prosecution where defendant was charged
with killing her newborn infant by feeding it a caustic substance, defendant introduced
testimony of a psychiatrist who maintained defendant was incapable of committing this
crime. In order to illuminate the basis for this opinion, the court permitted the jurors to view
a film of a hypnotic interview between defendant and the psychiatrist. Despite the
emotionally-charged content of the film, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in
the first degree. Time, April 12, 1968, at 57.
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should state his professional opinion regarding the effectiveness of
the techniques used in dispelling the amnesia of the witness. The
operator would be subject to probing cross-examination regarding
each of these particulars. Adherence to this foundation requirement
abates the potential for distortion through improper suggestion of
the restored witness' recall to a level which is customarily tolerated
during pretrial interrogation and preparation situations. 38
The Smrekar majority articulated four factors as influential in the
determination that the testimony of the hypno-revived witness in
this case was untainted by improper suggestion. It is crucial to note
that each of these factors was not intended, and therefore should not
be construed, as requisites of foundation which must be fulfilled in
each case as a precondition to admissibility. 9
First, the court pronounced the operator, a physician licensed as
a general practitioner who regularly incorporated hypnosis into his
treatment processes, competent. Qualifications, skill and experi-
ence of the operator must, of course, be established as a foundation
matter. The question, however, becomes whether an operator must
qualify as a specialist in hypnosis40 in order to be deemed compe-
tent. It is submitted that standards governing the degree of experi-
ence or training necessary to qualify a hypnotist as an expert should
be identical to those ordinarily obtaining for other disciplines.,' Cer-
tainly, the credentials presented by a particular operator might be
determined too meagre to allow his testimony to be considered by
the fact finder.2 However, so long as minimal competence of the
operator is established, as was apparently done in the Smrekar case,
further questions of qualification generally should bear on the
Thus, production of a record of the interview, although desirable, should not constitute an
inflexible requirement.
38. A. TRANKEL, RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE 25-27 (1972); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology
of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973). That
the perception and recall of many witnesses is modified through coaching and suggestion
during pretrial preparation by the proponent of the witness is well-recognized. Marshall,
Evidence, Psychology and the Trial: Some Challenges to the Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 197,
213 (1963).
39. The court refers to the foundation evidence adduced in this case by determining that
the operator was competent, and the techniques utilized not unduly suggestive. 68 Ill. App.
3d 379, 387, 385 N.E.2d 848, 854 (1979).
40. Although the American Medical Association has designated hypnosis as an area of
recognized specialization, such specialization does not lead to board certification. Directory
of Medical Specialists (17th ed. 1977).
41. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 898 (1961).
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weight to be accorded the operator's testimony.43
Second, the court determined that "suggestion was not used in
the hypnosis."" It is important to specify what the court meant by
this term "suggestion." It must be reiterated that suggestibility of
the subject is inextricably bound up with the hypnotic induction
process, and therefore cannot be wholly prevented, just as suggesti-
bility cannot be eradicated from interrogation situations generally."
However, absent any attempt by the operator, or anyone else pres-
ent during the induction process, to construct the subject's memory,
suggestibility during hypnosis should bear on the weight, rather
than the admissibility of the subject's testimony. As previously
stated, 6 the lack of implantation of improper suggestion should be
established by the operator as a foundation matter.
Third, the court noted that the witness' "identification was corro-
borated by other substantial evidence unknown to the witness at the
time she made positive identification of the defendant." 7 Corrobor-
ation is significant in the Smrekar case, because the issue was drawn
more narrowly than the admissibility of the testimony of a witness
whose memory has been restored through hypnosis. Rather, defen-
dant urged that the hypnotic treatment undergone by the witness
altered her recall of the events on the night her brother was mur-
dered, thereby impermissibly tainting her subsequent identification
of him at the courthouse, and at trial. Independent evidence corro-
borating her identification was significant in terms of establishing
its validity and basis in her recall. 48
The existence of corroborating evidence in a case raising the
broader issue of admissibility of testimony of a hypno-restored wit-
ness is pertinent only as it bears on the credibility of the evidence.
So long as a proper foundation is adduced, the revived witness'
testimony requires no corroboration in order to be admitted for con-
sideration by the trier of fact. The proper approach is to allow the
43. Formal education is not a requirement to be considered an expert. To render an
opinion an expert need only possess special skill and knowledge beyond that of the ordinary
layman. Buckler v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 216 N.E.2d 14 (1966). Non-medical
personnel have often been held qualified to give an opinion on medical questions because of
practical experience in the area. See, e.g., Hocker v. O'Klock, 16 Ill. 2d 414, 158 N.E.2d 7
(1959); Piacentini v. Bonnefil, 69 Ill. App. 2d 433, 217 N.E.2d 507 (1966). Thus, it is not
necessary for the physician to specialize in hypnosis in order to qualify as an expert. A
practicing hypnotist, who is not a doctor, would also qualify. See generally Spector, Who is
An Expert, 1977 ILL. JUDICL CONF. Rev. 144.
44. 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855.
45. See notes 29 through 32 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 36 through 38 supra and accompanying text.
47. 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855.
48. See generally Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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hypnotically-refreshed witness to testify, and reserve the existence
of corroboration as a means for gauging the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to sustain a verdict."
Finally, the court noted that "the evidence showed that at the
time of the occurrence, the witness had ample opportunity to view
[defendant]." 50 This observation merely states the first-hand
knowledge requirement, a precondition to the testimony of any wit-
ness, 5 and thus does not peculiarly relate to admissibility of testi-
mony of a hypno-restored witness.
The second concern, that lay jurors may accord disproportionate
weight to hypno-induced testimony, is neutralized by proper in-
struction. A touchstone of our adversary system is the conviction
that jurors are endowed with sophistication sufficient to enable
them to exercise discrimination in culling permissible uses for a
piece of evidence from among several impermissible uses. Forceful,
clear instruction explaining the restorative function of hypnosis as
a memory aid, rather than as a mechanical indicator of veracity,
should adequately secure the jury's ability to assess the significance
and credibility of a hypno-revived witness' testimony.52
b) Additional Uses
The Smrekar majority noted that "when the test results of hypno-
sis of a witness have been offered in evidence through the testimony
of the examining expert as to what the witness told the expert while
under hypnosis, the courts have, apparently uniformly, ruled this
testimony to be inadmissible."53 The import of this statement is
49. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968). Contra, Greenfield v. Com-
monwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974) (testimony from witness whose memory has
been hypnotically restored is admissible only where substantially corroborated by other evi-
dence). It has been argued that restricting admission of testimony of a hypnotically-restored
witness is not only erroneous as a matter of evidence law, but also may deprive defendant of
due process under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Spector &
Foster, supra note 2, at 610-13.
50. People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388, 285 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979).
51. People v. Poland, 22 Ill. 2d 175, 183, 174 N.E.2d 804, 808 (1961). See also FED. R. EvD.
602.
52. A sample instruction is as follows:
You have heard the testimony of a witness whose memory was restored when
[sihe underwent hypnosis. You have also heard the testimony of the doctor
[expert] who conducted the hypnotic session[s] regarding the effectiveness of
hypnosis as a means of restoring lost memories. The fact that a witness has been
hypnotized does not relate in any way on his/her credibility, and does not entitle
his/her testimony to any particular weight. The testimony of a witness who has been
hypnotized must still be evaluated and weighed by you very carefully. You are the
sole judges of the facts of this case, and that includes the reliability of each and
every witness, and the weight to be placed on the testimony of each.
53. 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979).
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unclear. If the court is saying that statements uttered by the subject
while in hypnotic trance have not been admitted when offered as
proof of the truth of the content of those statements, the court's
observation is accurate. 4 If, however, the court is suggesting that
use of hypno-induced evidence is limited to a restorative function,
the statement is clearly incorrect. A number of uses for hypno-
retrieved evidence are feasible, some of which are proper, some of
which are improper. Analysis of the propriety of injecting evidence
adduced with the aid of hypnosis into the trial process must proceed
on the basis of the articulated purpose for which the evidence is
offered, not simply on the basis of a rule which decrees the admissi-
bility or inadmissibility of such evidence. Thus, for example, an
attempt by an operator to testify that the version of an event related
by the witness at trial was identical to the account that the witness
related while under hypnosis would constitute impermissible accre-
ditation and should be disallowed.5 Evidentiary considerations
aside, this use of hypnosis distorts its utility by torturing its func-
tion to conform to that of a truth-determinant, a role to which this
phenomenon is ill-suited.
A legitimate use of hypnosis in the trial process is as part of the
basis for an expert opinion regarding the mental state of the hyp-
notic subject. Contrary to the traditional position regarding permis-
sible data upon which an expert might depend in the formulation
of an opinion to be elicited in the trial context," Illinois, in People
v. Ward,57 has apparently embraced the logical viewpoint embodied
in Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5" Rule 703 wisely
54. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976); Greenfield v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974). But see Spector & Foster, supra note 2,
at 602-13, and text accompanying note 67 infra.
55. Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Cr. App. 1975).
56. Traditionally, an expert witness lacking first-hand knowledge is permitted to testify
only on the basis of hypothetical questions; many jurisdictions require that the data con-
tained in the question be material that has been, or will be admissible at trial. E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE §§ 14-15 (2d ed. 1972). The rationale
supporting this position was prevention of contamination of the trial by hearsay and other
unreliable information being cloaked by the expert's opinion. This position is obviously erro-
neous, since much of the data and knowledge forming the basis for the expert's opinion are
not independently provable at trial. Basis material merely serves an explicative function, and
is therefore not offered as proof of the truth of the matter asserted.
57. 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975). See Spector, People v. Ward: Toward a Recon-
struction of Expert Testimony in Illinois, 26 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 284 (1977).
58. FED. R. EvD. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
1979] Hypno-Induced Statements 705
permits an expert to adapt and utilize in formulating an opinion any
material which an expert would reasonably rely upon. As a scientific
phenomenon, hypnosis is a tool of recognized utility in the treat-
ment of amnesia and other psychological problems; it is effective
because of its capacity to ferret out data for use in treatment. The
usefulness of this data for the psychotherapist is in no way depen-
dant upon its veracity. 59 Therefore, allowing an expert to formulate
a conclusion based upon hypnotic contact with the subject, and to
state that conclusion for consideration by the finder of fact, accords
with established law in both Illinois and the federal system.8
The Smrekar majority cited two cases, in support of its afore-
stated observation, which repudiated expert evaluation of mental
state premised upon hypno-induced statements." However, the
weight of judicial authority is contrary, sanctioning expert opinions
based, at least in part, upon hypnotic statements. 2 It should be
noted parenthetically that in the cognate area of narcoanalysis Illi-
nois courts have permitted experts to explain opinions premised on
narco-induced statements . 3
The only remaining inquiry concerning the permissible use of
hypno-induced statements as a premise for expert evaluation of
mental state is the propriety of permitting the operator to relate
statements made by the subject under hypnosis in order to clarify
59. Orne, The Potential Uses of Hypnosis in Interrogation, in THE MANIPULATION OF
HuMAN BEHAVIOR 195 (A. Biderman & H. Zimmer eds. 1961).
60. See Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 597-601.
61. Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Greenfield v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974). The remaining cases cited by the Smrekar
majority held the profferred hypno-induced evidence inadmissible on other grounds. In Jones
v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Cr. App. 1975), the testimony constituted impermissible
accreditation of the subject's trial testimony. In State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414
(1974), defendant sought to elicit from the operator statements defendant had made while
hypnotized which related to defendant's whereabouts on particular dates and to defendant's
culpability in order to prove the substantive truth of those statements. The hypnotist was
permitted to testify to knowledge regarding defendant's mental state which was gleaned from
the hypnotic examination. Likewise, in State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1951),
defendant offered the results of his hypnotic examination as proof of his protestations of
innocence contained therein.
62. The watershed case is People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1963). Cases in accord include People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App. 2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906
(1968); State v. Harris, 241 Or. 500, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207
S.E.2d 414 (1974).
A California case seemingly contrary to Modesto, People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d
314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961), is clearly distinguishable, since the Busch court determined that
the proferred expert lacked appropriate credentials as a hypnotist, and was therefore not
permitted to render an opinion premised on hypno-induced testimony.
63. People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019
(1967); People v. Seipel, 108 Ill. App. 2d 384, 247 N.E.2d 905 (1969).
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the basis for the opinion and better equip the trier of fact to intelli-
gently evaluate it. The hazard, of course, is that the jury may accord
such evidence substantive weight. Although there is some indication
that such utterances may be communicated to the finder of fact in
explanation of the expert's opinion," it is submitted that, in accord-
ance with judicial authority on this point, discretion must be lodged
in the trial court to exclude the statements where it is determined
that the risk of jury utilization of this material substantively out-
weighs the worth of the statements in terms of understanding the
expert's opinion. "5 Presumably, this would be the result in the fed-
eral system, and could be secured in Illinois through judicial adop-
tion of a provision analogous to Federal Rule 705.16
64. People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 600, 335 P.2d 114, 121 (1959) (tape recording of
statements made by defendant to psychiatrist while under narcoanalysis not hearsay when
offered to explain basis and are therefore admissible). In Lemmon v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R.,
9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 (1959), the court stated in regard to statements made by plaintiff
to a psychiatrist while under narcoanalysis:
It is recognized that there is danger that such statements may be taken as evidence
of the matters stated and also that being related by the doctor may give them an
aura of authenticity beyond that of the original declarant. But this danger is pres-
ent in a great deal of evidence which is hearsay when used for one purpose and not
hearsay when used for another. However, the hazards therein are outweighed by the
psychiatrist's need and obligation to demonstrate the foundation for his opinion so
that the jury may intelligently evaluate it and may be guarded against by proper
admonition to the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is re-
ceived ...
Id. at 201, 341 P.2d at 219.
In a slightly different context, namely, the relationship of expert testimony to the formula-
tion of a definition for and parameters of the insanity defense, Judge Bazelon has urged that
"[tihe job of the expert is to give the jury the basic information it needs to make [itsj
decision - to tell the jury all he can about the defendant's mental and emotional processes,
his behavior controls and about how he came to his unlawful act" (citation omitted). Bazelon,
New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 653, 659
(1971). See also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 452-55 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en
banc).
65. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1963);
State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); see also State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551,
374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963) (statements made during narcoanaly-
sis).
Predictably enough, the trial judge has generally excluded the statements, and this exclu-
sion is affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); People
v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App. 2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1968); People v. Myers, 35 111. 2d 311, 220
N.E.2d 297 (1966); State v. Chase, 206 Kan. 352, 480 P.2d 62 (1971).
66. FED. R. EviD. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underly-
ing facts or data on cross-examination.
The rule is clearly fashioned to eliminate the ineffectual and redundant hypothetical ques-
tion. By implication, if the rule gives the court discretion to compel recitation of facts forming
the basis for the expert's opinion, it also authorizes the court to refuse to permit recitation of
Hypno-Induced Statements
Finally, the question of substantive admissibility of hypno-
induced statements must be addressed. When offered as substan-
tive proof of the truth of content of the statements, this evidence is
susceptible to a recurring objection on hearsay grounds, regardless
of whether the declarant, the hypnotic subject, actually testifies at
trial. It is submitted, however, that if material hypnotically ad-
duced fulfills admissibility requirements for any established excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, the fact that the matter is a product of
hypnotic induction should have no bearing on admissibility, so long
as foundation requisites are satisfied."
CONCLUSION
Advances in scientific research have removed hypnotism from the
realm of carnival diversion. Its value for a panoply of psychothera-
peutic purposes foreshadows widespread clinical and diagnostic use,
as well as accompanying increases in scientific research and theoret-
ical evaluation. Judicial thought in clarifying the relationship be-
tween hypnotic phenomena and the evidentiary process must paral-
lel this scientific progression, so that utilization of hypno-induced
statements results in development of hypnosis as a salutary litiga-
tion device.
particular data. By its terms, Rule 705 is not exempted from the general balancing of proba-
tive value versus counterfactors mandated by FED. R. EVID. 403.
In fact, adoption by the Illinois courts of an analogue to Rule 705 seems a natural conse-
quence of the court's espousal of the principles articulated by Rule 703. Although the winnow-
ing of data through the evaluative processes of the expert renders material reliable enough
to serve as a basis for the expert's conclusion, that same material might prove too provocative
or prejudicial to warrant its transmission to the trier of fact.
67. Cf. Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973). In that case, plaintiff sought to
introduce testimony of a physician and tape recordings of a hypnotic session, during which
plaintiff stated his speed prior to the accident was only 55 m.p.h. Plaintiff urged admissibility
under the hearsay exception for statements made to a treating physician. Although properly
excluded on hearsay grounds because the statements, relating to cause of the mishap, were
outside the parameters of the exception, admissibility would be warranted were the hypno-
induced statements properly within the confines of some recognized exception.
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